Vickrey auction

Results: 333



#Item
51Economics Letters – 73 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation ☆ Philippe Jehiel a,b , Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn c , Benny Moldovanu d,⁎, William R. Zame e

Economics Letters – 73 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation ☆ Philippe Jehiel a,b , Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn c , Benny Moldovanu d,⁎, William R. Zame e

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Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-01 17:14:33
52Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗  Google Inc.,

Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗ Google Inc.,

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Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
53* Technical University Berlin, Germany ** Laval University, Canada This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649

* Technical University Berlin, Germany ** Laval University, Canada This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de

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Source URL: sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-08-03 08:36:24
54CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 14, 2013

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 14, 2013

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:31:05
55Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

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Source URL: web.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-08-08 16:20:04
56Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline  Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-05-12 00:18:06
57T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI  Revenue Submodularity

T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI Revenue Submodularity

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Source URL: theoryofcomputing.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-14 13:01:36
58Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 8 Incentives vs Computation ETH Z¨

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 8 Incentives vs Computation ETH Z¨

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-26 12:27:11
59CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #9: Beyond Quasi-Linearity∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 21,

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #9: Beyond Quasi-Linearity∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 21,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:32:41
60Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design † ∗  Felix Fischer

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design † ∗ Felix Fischer

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-30 16:18:44